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Abstract
Functionalism is the view that a system (or system component) grasps the meaning of its inputs to the extent that it produces the right
outputs. If a system retrieves all and only relevant documents in response to a query, we say it understands the query.  If a robot
avoids bumping into walls, we say it understands its sensors and its environment.  If a chess program beats the world champion, we
say it understands the game.  One kind of functionalism, conventional functionalism, is currently very popular and productive in
artificial intelligence and the other cognitive sciences, but it requires humans to specify the meanings of assertions.  A second kind of
functionalism, natural semantics requires computers to learn these meanings.  This paper discusses the limitations of conventional
functionalism and describes some robotics work from our laboratory on natural semantics.
Natural Semantics for a Mobile Robot
Abstract
Functionalism is the view that a system (or system
component) grasps the meaning of its inputs to the extent
that it produces the right outputs. If a system retrieves all
and only relevant documents in response to a query, we say
it understands the query.  If a robot avoids bumping into
walls, we say it understands its sensors and its environment.
If a chess program beats the world champion, we say it
understands the game.  One kind of functionalism,
conventional functionalism, is currently very popular and
productive in artificial intelligence and the other cognitive
sciences, but it requires humans to specify the meanings of
assertions.  A second kind of functionalism, natural
semantics requires computers to learn these meanings.  This
paper discusses the limitations of conventional
functionalism and describes some robotics work from our
laboratory on natural semantics.
Conventional Functionalism
A defining characteristic and a great accomplishment of
artificial intelligence (AI) is its reduction of semantics to
syntax.  As Haugeland put it, “If you take care of the
syntax, the semantics will take care of itself.” An early,
celebrated example of syntactic, faux-meaning was
Weizenbaum’s Eliza system.  You could chat with Eliza by
typing sentences, to which Eliza would respond with
comments that ranged from banal to bizarre to insightful.
Eliza did not understand the conversation except in the
functionalist sense. Consider an Eliza-like dialog:  Me:
“You never take out the trash.”  Eliza: “Would you like me
to take out the trash?”  Me: “Yes!”   Eliza: “Ok.”
Needless to say, Eliza doesn’t take out the trash and
wouldn’t even if it were connected to a robot, because it
has no clue what “take out the trash” means.  All it knows
is that the syntactic form, “You never X” can be responded
to with, “Would you like me to X?”
Fast forward thirty years, and we find a vast corpus of
programs that are much more sophisticated than Eliza but
take an identical approach to meaning. Many problems can
be solved by attending to very narrow aspects of meaning,
or to no aspect of meaning at all.  For example, some
problems in natural language can be solved by attending to
statistical properties of word co-occurrences, not word
meanings. We have become adept at selecting problems
that our programs can solve without attending to meaning;
or rather, problems for which syntactic operations such as
counting word co-occurrences are proxies for semantic
operations such as reasoning about meanings of words.
Moreover, humans are remarkably susceptible to what we
might call semantic illusion.  This is how semantic illusion
works:  We provide programs with inputs that are
meaningful to us, the programs produce outputs that are
meaningful to us; and presto, we think the inputs are
meaningful to the machine.  An information retrieval
system takes a query that is meaningful to us and returns
documents that are meaningful to us, and we say it
understands the query.  It does not.  It simply reflects a
functionally sufficient sliver of our understanding of the
query more or less faithfully.  All meanings are our
meanings, the machine has no independent understanding
of anything.  We project our meanings onto the symbols
manipulated by our programs.
This critical assessment of conventional functionalism
should not obscure its many accomplishments. Expert
systems, for instance, are masterpieces of conventional
functionalism.  It doesn’t matter that “stiff neck” and
“headache” and “meningitis” mean almost nothing to an
expert system, as long as the system produces the right
output symbol (e.g., meningitis) for a given set of inputs
(stiff neck, etc.).  Expert systems and many other
successful AI systems are essentially scratchpads for us,
the users.  We assign meanings to the symbols that these
systems shift around, and we are often very happy with the
results.
Natural Semantics
A natural semantic system is one that acquires and
maintains meanings for itself.  Humans learn meanings of
mental states and representations, refining these meanings
throughout their lives.  Natural semantic systems are not
mere scratchpads for meanings assigned by exogenous
agents (i.e., programmers), nor must they be told what
things mean.  You don’t require anyone to tell you the
meaning of stubbing your toe or finding $100 in your
pocket. You know what events and sentences mean
because you have learned (or learned to work out) these
meanings. Because you are a natural semantic system, we
expect you to understand this paragraph and quite literally
draw your own conclusions about it.  If your conclusions
differ from ours, it is not because you have a bug in your
program that we need to fix, it is because you maintain a
semantic system that overlaps largely but not entirely with
ours.
Natural semantic systems are very rare in AI.  A case might
be made that reinforcement learning produces natural
semantic systems, as the meanings of states (i.e., their
values) are learned from a reinforcement signal.  Sadly,
much work in reinforcement learning tries to coerce
systems to learn value functions (i.e., meanings of states)
that we  want them to learn.  This is accomplished by
fiddling with the reinforcement signal, the state space, and
a batch of other factors, until the system becomes a
conventional functional system – one that produces what
we consider to be the correct outputs for a set of inputs.  It
is terribly ironic that reinforcement learning is capable of
producing at least rudimentary natural semantic systems
but we use it to produce conventional systems [10].
The Limitations of Conventional Functional
Systems
Conventional functionalism is a good way to build systems
with a little semantics that do what we want them to, so
most AI systems will quite appropriately continue to be
based in conventional functionalism.  The issue is not
whether we should stop building such systems, but whether
we can actually build conventional functional systems with
more than a little semantics, as is required by natural
language understanding and other semantically-rich tasks.
Let us also recognize that, for a given, specific task,  the
semantic content acquired naturally by an intelligent agent
can be duplicated or mimicked by a sufficiently motivated
knowledge engineer; so the issue is not whether natural
semantic systems can think or mean things that
conventional functional systems cannot think or mean, but
whether there are enough knowledge engineers on the
planet to build a conventional functional system that
understands as much as we do.
The crux of the argument against conventional functional
semantics and for natural semantics is this:  To build a
conventional functional system, you have to design a
system whose syntactic operations produce results that you
can interpret as meaningful.  This design task is very
expensive, so expensive, in fact, that we have not been able
to build conventional functional systems for semantically
deep tasks such as natural language understanding.
Programming a computer is a paradigmatic example of this
design problem.  Programs are syntactic machines, and if
you want meaningful outputs, you have to write programs
whose syntactic operations are meaningful to you. Doug
Lenat and John Seely Brown recognized this problem in a
paper called “Why AM and Eurisko Appear to Work” [20].
The AM system discovered many concepts in number
theory, but when the AM approach was tried in other
domains, it didn’t work as well.  Lenat and Brown
concluded that AM worked because syntactic Lisp
operations on Lisp representations of mathematical
concepts often produced meaningful new mathematical
concepts, whereas syntactic Lisp operations on Lisp
representations of other kinds of concepts rarely produced
meaningful new concepts:
“It was only because of the intimate relationship
between Lisp and Mathematics that the mutation
operators … turned out to yield a high “hit rate” of
viable, useful new math concepts.  … Of course we
can never directly mutate the meaning of a concept,
we can only mutate the structural form of the concept
as embedded in some representation scheme.  Thus
there is never a guarantee that we aren’t just mutating
some ‘implementation detail’ that is a consequence of
the representation, rather than some genuine part of
the concept’s intentionality.” [20, p.237]
So, Haugeland is correct to say Good Old-Fashioned AI
tries to “take care of the syntax, and the semantics will take
care of itself,” but taking care of the syntax is very hard!
Let’s be clear about why conventional functional systems
are hard to build.  All computer-based systems, including
natural semantic systems, operate on the “structural form”
of concepts, not directly on the meanings of concepts.  The
problem is maintaining a correspondence between the
results of syntactic operations and meanings:  Too often the
results of operations are not meaningful.  In conventional
functional systems, the system itself cannot check whether
its results are meaningful because it doesn’t know the
meanings of its results – all meanings are exogenous,
maintained by humans, and so only humans can check
whether the system’s conclusions make sense.  This
checking, and subsequent corrections, are very expensive.1
In natural semantic systems, operations on data structures
are also syntactic, but the system itself is responsible for
maintaining the correspondence between syntactic forms
and their meanings, and the system itself checks whether
syntactic operations produce meaningful results. Suppose a
robot is planning to move to an object.  Syntactically, it
generates a plan to rotate the left wheel in one direction
and the right wheel in the other direction.  When it
executes this plan, it spins around.  The meaning of this
plan is, among other things, that it does not achieve the
robot’s goal of moving toward the object.  But we do not
have to tell the robot this, because the robot maintains the
semantics of its plans, itself.
Natural Semantics for a Robot
This is how it is supposed to work – indeed, does work, to
a limited extent – in our laboratory. We provide a Pioneer 1
robot with a handful of activities, little programs for
moving, turning, opening its gripper, and so on. We also
provide the robot with something like curiosity, a drive to
explore things it hasn’t done recently or doesn’t recognize.
The robot moves around its environment, collecting
                                    
1
 Logic is supposed to solve this problem for us by allowing only
truth-preserving inferences.  All such valid inferences produce
meaningful conclusions so nobody need check whether the
conclusions are meaningful.  This logicist position has many
weaknesses, not the least of which is that truth preserving
inferences may produce objects that have no denotation in the
world, or no interest to us, as Lenat and Brown discovered.
experiences.  Experiences are just time series of the sensor
vector (which currently contains roughly 40 sensed values
sampled every 100 msec.)  We run statistical procedures to
find common sequences in the time series of the sensor
vector [1].  We cluster these sequences, and in the process
discover clusters that correspond to activities such as
bumping into a wall and grasping a cup.  We call these
prototypes – sensory patterns that correspond to the robot’s
common activities [2,3].  It is not difficult to turn
prototypes into planning operators [4,6].  Then, with a
simple planning algorithm, our robot has started to
construct more complex activities in service of its goals.
Its goals, not ours, as dictated by its curiosity mechanism.
Each of the robot’s activities has roles. When we observe
or describe activities, we assign roles to the participants.
For example, you  are the reader, this is what you are
reading, we wrote it, and the text itself is conveyed by
some medium such as print.  Familiar roles such as actor,
action, object, subject, and instrument, may be augmented
with more specific roles such as “the object on my left.”
General or specific, the idea is the same:  A scene is
described and presumably represented in terms of the roles
of its participants – the causal relations that hold among the
participants’ actions.
Roles are the key to having our robot learn an ontology
through interaction with its environment.  Just as we may
define “chair” in terms of interaction – a chair is something
we sit in – so does our robot ontology include objects that
fit between the grippers, objects that can be lifted, objects
that do not move, objects that are so large that they are not
entirely visible when the robot touches them, and so on.
Classes of objects follow directly from roles; indeed, for
each role played by an object (e.g., being picked up by the
robot) there is a class of objects that have played or could
play that role.  The same point holds for actions which play
roles in activities.  If the robot could perceive the roles
played by objects and actions, it could develop a
conceptual system, an ontology, an organization of objects
and actions into classes defined by experience.
Much of the meaning of a token, such as a word, or a sonar
reading, is in the roles played by the denotation of the
token.  For example, “table leg” denotes a piece of
furniture that often causes trouble for our robot.  To the
robot, “table leg” evokes experiences of abrupt
deceleration and complicated attempts at disengagement.
To us, “table leg” means something else,  although the
robot’s meaning is not entirely alien to us.  Still, it’s a
stretch to say we and the robot have a shared understanding
of the phrase “table leg.”  So how does the story so far
account for shared meaning and convivial computers.  A
token means the same thing to you as it does to me if it
denotes something that plays the same roles in your
experiences as it does in mine.  To the extent that our robot
has similar experiences as we have, the tokens that denote
aspects of those experiences will have similar meanings.
How much of this story is fantasy and how much exists
today?  We have a robot that creates prototypes that
correspond to its common experiences [1,2,3].  It can
cluster these prototypes and discover, entirely without our
supervision, common experiences like moving past a cup
or bumping into a wall.  It can also recognize words and
link them up with experiences [7].  Recently, it turned
some of its prototypes into planning operators, and built a
plan for a goal of its own choosing [4].  The missing piece
of our story concerns roles.  The prototypes learned by the
robot correspond to the sensory experience of doing
something, but they are not denoting representations.  For
example, the robot knows how its sensors react to driving
into a wall, but it has no concept of wall, and it does not
represent the episode as one entity doing something to
another.
The Roles Problem
The roles problem involves getting from sensors to “who
did what to whom.” It will be clear that the roles problem
is an instance of a more general perception problem
[16,11].  Perception establishes the connection between
moving patches of light and objects in the environment.
Perception establishes the roles these objects play in scenes
we observe.
Like it or not, we cannot solve the roles problem without
giving our robot a perceptual system.  However, we
needn’t “solve the vision problem” as a prerequisite to
natural semantics, because a rudimentary perceptual
system will suffice.  All we need is a way to map from
sensory patterns to scene elements.  The solution might be
as simple as identifying the scene elements by their
characteristic color and size. But instead of cobbling
together a perceptual system, we want to build one that has
the essential characteristics of infant perceptual systems.
According to Bornstein [12], infants are preprogrammed
via neural mechanisms with a limited ability to recognize
an object as the same thing when encountered under
different conditions.  At first (i.e., at birth), this means
recognizing an object as the same under different lighting,
at various distances, and from different orientations.  That
is, there is a bias to assume that a pattern of perceptual
information that serves as a perceptual anchor in the array
while other aspects of the environment are changing must
be “the same thing”.  We are currently providing this bias
to the robot.
There also appears to be an early-established coordination
of perceptual information from different sensory systems
[17].  Infants are able to recognize (in the sense of
responding to the object as if it was familiar) objects
encountered in one sense and re-presented via a different
sense (oral; visual; manual exploration).  This “cross-
modal transfer” implies that perceptual information is
being integrated into a central representation of “an
object”.  By analogy, we use the temporally synchronized
information from different systems in the robot (vision;
gripper; wheel movement) as the basis for a primitive
perceptual recognition system [8].
However, the detection of perceptual identity and similarity
is not sufficient for a natural semantics. Conceptual
understanding requires more than merely the ability to see
that two things look alike; it requires an understanding that
two things are alike.  Human toddlers assume, without ever
being explicitly told, that caterpillars and emus share the
same kinds of “innards” whereas cars have something
different inside.  Conversely, no human infant would
behave in the same manner towards a real cat and an
animated stuffed-animal cat, no matter how realistic the toy
version might be.  The essential difference in meaning is
that some things are alive whereas others are not.  The next
step is therefore to find a way to extract meaning from
perception; we propose to implement a process known as
perceptual redescription.
Mandler [21,22,23] proposes that infants do not merely
perceive the world; they select or extract a subset of
information from their percepts, at the cost  of other
information.  The retained information is a redescription of
the original perceptual event.  Mandler argues that what's
extracted from the perceptual analysis is an image schema,
which is a form of representation in which the spatial
structure of the represented world is preserved, including
the motion of objects in the world and temporal relations,
in the representing world. An example of an image schema
is PATH: a pattern of motion with a start and an end, and a
direction, that can be regular or irregular.
CONTAINMENT; AGENCY; and CAUSED MOTION
are others.  Image schemas can be combined and embedded
to form more complex meanings: thus, ANIMAL is an
agent that starts on its own, and has an irregular path of
motion.  Even temporal concepts can be represented in
spatial terms: we speak of one thing occuring “before” (in
front of) another, or “after” (behind).
Mandler argues that these spatial patterns and relations are
the core meanings that underlie all of human semantics, a
claim that has considerable support from work on infant
concepts. The notion of image schemas also finds support
in linguistics and philosophy [15,18,19].  Some empirical
evidence that children really do develop image-schema like
mental structures has been gathered by [13,14,24,25,26].
It is of course possible that the particular set of image
schemas proposed by Mandler are not the “right ones”.  It
is also possible that the entire notion of going from a richly
detailed array of perceptual information into a small set of
spatial redescriptions is not the right way to build a
conceptual system.  Yet the advantages of the perceptual
redescription theory are that a) it is testable; b) it seems to
be the way that human infants build the basis for a natural
semantics, and c) it provides a reasonable solution to the
greater problem of where meanings originate.  As
philosophers have noted, there must either be a small set of
core primitives from which all of semantics is constructed,
or we must be born with all possible meanings pre-
encoded.  The latter claim is developmentally implausible
in the case of human infants, and of little help to the goal of
building convivial computers.  By contrast, image schemas
are developmentally plausible and are specific enough to
implement in a robot.  Indeed, so general are image
schemas that we have built a planner for tactical wargames
based on them [9].
Grant us a moment of speculation on the kinds of concepts
and meanings that our robot will learn and share with us.
Some aspects of the robot’s experience are alien to us, but
much is common.  For example, we move on planar
surfaces from one place to another, so does the robot.  We
see things in the foreground more clearly than things in the
background, so does the robot.  The optic flow of
foreground objects is relatively high for us and for the
robot.  We can move something by pushing it, so can the
robot.  When we turn, objects enter and leave our field of
view, as they do for the robot.  When we bump into
something, we sense force, as does the robot.  In sum,
many physical activities are essentially the same for us and
for the robot.
Does this mean we are condemned to discussing only
physical activities with our robot?  A really convivial
computer would understand the mental world, too.  Are we
limited to discussing pushing and moving with the robot or
can we also discuss our busy day, our delightful children,
our new research?  Can the robot learn such concepts and
their meanings?  Two pieces of evidence give us hope.
First, infants are born sensorimotor agents not unlike our
robot.  They don’t think, they interact.  Therefore, all
knowledge is grounded in physical interaction – be it ever
so abstract and non-physical, this knowledge is learned by
an intelligence that once was purely physical.  Second,
some linguists (e.g., [18]) believe that the semantic basis
for nonphysical concepts is physical concepts .  For
example, we are developing a line of argument, which
leads to a hopeful conclusion;  you grasp it as it takes
shape. The missing piece of the argument is the mechanism
for extending physical concepts into a nonphysical space.
Linguists say this mechanism is metaphor.  All the
italicized words in the previous sentences are physical
concepts used metaphorically here.
In summary, we have started to build a natural semantic
system, a robot that learns concepts and meanings by
interacting with its environment.  Whereas a functionalist
would claim that a robot understands walls if it avoids
crashing into them (or solves some other problem set by
the functionalist), we claim that the token “wall” means
something to the robot, something related to the robot’s
experiences with walls (as distinct from experiences that
we programmed the robot to have); and to the extent that
we have had similar experiences with walls, we share a
common understanding of “wall” with the robot.  We are
very hopeful that robots will be able to talk to us not only
about their physical experiences, but also about mental
concepts that are metaphorical extensions of physical
concepts.
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